Micheal D. Kirchhoff
in NODES 27 → 2026
https://doi.org/10.57633/NODES-27/7-ENG
Imaginary models discussed in science are composed of idealizations used to understand aspects of reality. Working with idealized models is a tried and tested practice in physics, chemistry, biology and other model-based sciences. This paper argues that when idealized models are used in computational neuroscience and philosophy of cognitive science we typically encounter “the metaphilosophical problem”: the error of treating an abstract construct, model or explanatory tool as if it were a concrete, mind-independent entity, process or mechanism. The conclusion is that models of neural representation and models of neural computation do not succeed in showing the minds and brains are representational and computational, because these central theoretical constructs are themselves idealizations.
To cite this article: Kirchhoff, M. D. (2026). Scientific Idealizations of the Mind and Brain: A Metaphilosophical Problem. Nodes (27):117-125, Numero Cromatico Editore, Roma